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INTRODUCTION
The world’s oceans, in particular the Arctic Ocean, are taking on more and more of a geopolitical focus because of a continuing shortage of land-based raw 
materials, the expected resource wealth in the Arctic, new 
conveyor and transport technologies, and the progressive cli-
matic amelioration. These factors have aroused a worldwide 
interest in the Arctic, especially among the A5, as the Arctic 
States–Canada, Russia, the United States of America, Nor-
way, and Denmark–call themselves. Each of these nations 
claims part of the Arctic Ocean (Fig. 1). Unlike its southern 
counterpart, the Antarctic, the Arctic is not protected by a 
contract, and therefore territorial claims are not illegal.
The basic legal reference document for all Arctic sover-
eignty and territorial claims is the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS Article 76 
(No. 8) allows a coastal state to expand its marine territory 
beyond the standard 200–nautical mile zone if it can provide 
geological evidence that its continental shelf extends beyond 
this limit (United Nations, 1982:54). A coastal state has 10 
years from the date it ratifies UNCLOS to apply to the com-
mission to extend its continental shelf. The applications for 
enlargement of the marine territory are submitted to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), 
which reviews each submission and makes a recommenda-
tion to the coastal nation. If the coastal nation and the CLCS 
agree, the nation can fix its external frontiers and make the 
new border binding. CLCS approval is not mandatory prior 
to a nation’s expanding its boundaries. Russia submitted an 
application in 2001, which was rejected. Canada has until 
2013 to submit an application and Denmark has until 2014. 
Norway submitted an application in 2006, but a recommen-
dation from CLCS is still pending. The United States has 
not ratified UNCLOS (United Nations, 1982; UNEP/GRID-
Arendal, 2009).
ACCESS AND RESOURCES
Until recently, the Arctic region seemed isolated from the 
rest of the world. However, the dramatic changes that are 
now taking place in the Arctic will lead to greater acces-
sibility and therefore to new opportunities for economic use.
Climate Change
Climate warming makes the Arctic and its resources more 
accessible for exploitation. According to the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007), climate change 
is occurring nearly twice as fast in the Arctic as in the rest of 
the world. The Arctic can be considered as an early warning 
system for climate change. Since the 1980s, the average tem-
peratures in the Arctic have risen about 3% (ACIA, 2004). 
Along with rising temperatures, the Arctic has experienced a 
dramatic increase in the annual extent of sea ice. This decline 
in sea-ice extent is particularly pronounced in September. In 
September 2007, the monthly ice extent was 23% less than in 
September 2005 (Stroeve et al., 2008). Over the entire sum-
mer of 2007, Arctic ice cover declined by 42%, reaching a 
record minimum (Maslanik et al., 2007).
The Oil & Gas Industry: New Extraction Technologies
Various studies, including those by the United States Geo-
logical Survey (Bird et al., 2008), have shown that the Arctic 
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FIG 1. Territorial claims in the Arctic.
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holds a high resource potential. It is estimated that more than 
30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas reserves and 
13% of its undiscovered oil reserves are located in the Arctic 
region (Bird et al., 2008; Gautier et al., 2009). Exactly how 
much oil and natural gas is hidden under the sea ice is uncer-
tain. Extraction is extremely costly, but rising global prices 
for oil may make this relatively expensive endeavor profit-
able. The oil and natural gas of the Arctic give some nations 
the potential to strengthen their current position with respect 
to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Conditions in the deep sea are extreme. To optimize 
deep-sea exploitation, the petroleum industry must invest 
in infrastructure and new techniques that are efficient and 
environmentally friendly. For example, floating production 
platforms will replace the huge fixed rigs. Also, smaller-
scale, sub-sea production technology is going to be used 
directly on the seabed (European Commission, 2007). 
Deep-sea petroleum tanker ships with the capacity to carry 
up to two million barrels of oil have now been developed. 
Despite these new technologies, the deep-sea ecosystem is 
extremely sensitive, and the effects of extracting deep-sea 
resources have not been investigated. 
Fish Stocks
The Arctic is an important commercial fishing ground, 
especially for the largest populations (salmon, cod, and coal-
fish). To what extent climate change will affect fish stocks is 
still unclear. The danger of overfishing or illegal fishing in 
the Arctic still remains and will rise with increasing acces-
sibility. New arrangements must be made for the protection 
of these fishing grounds.
THE ARCTIC
AS AN INTEREST AND CONFLICT SPACE
The Arctic region holds a huge potential, so it is hardly 
surprising that the A5 nations claim parts of the Arctic for 
themselves. At the same time, the danger exists that the dif-
ferent interests of the players will collide and lead to tension 
or political conflicts.
The new economic usability and the accessibility of the 
Arctic and the rapid climate warming have raised many 
questions about its future. Also the situation in the Arctic 
has become an important geopolitical issue in the media: it 
is often spoken of as a new “Great Game,” or “race for the 
raw materials of the North Pole” (Killaby, 2005; Howard, 
2009). Reports of Russian long-range bombers and subma-
rines patrolling dangerously close to Canadian territories 
in the Arctic strengthen the picture of a conflict (Shukman, 
2008; CBC News, 2009). Arctic territorial conflicts are 
not new. The Canadian archipelago, for example, has been 
investigated, mapped, and claimed by different nations in 
the past. As a result, there have been sovereignty and ter-
ritorial conflicts. Present border conflicts in the Arctic exist 
between Canada and Denmark, regarding the ownership of 
Hans Island in Nares Strait; Canada and the United States, 
regarding a sea area in the Beaufort Sea; Norway and Den-
mark, regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 
Spitsbergen; and Norway and Russia, regarding the EEZ in 
the Barents Sea (Fig. 1).
In addition to these border conflicts, a quarrel about the 
status of the Northwest Passage (NWP) remains unresolved. 
The NWP could shorten the transport distance from Europe 
to Asia considerably and compete with both the Panama 
Canal and the Suez Canal. The Passage runs through the 
Canadian archipelago, and Canada considers it as inter-
nal water. In contrast, the United States and the European 
Union perceive the NWP as international waters, within 
which they have the right to navigate freely. 
The current territorial claims in the Arctic could lead to 
new tensions as the map of the Arctic changes and issues 
of border protection increase. The A5 nations are currently 
engaged in a debate on the protection of marine borders and 
marine territories.
 
STAKEHOLDERS IN THE ARCTIC
The stakeholder structure in the Arctic is extremely com-
plex, because it stretches through several different levels: 
international, regional (circumpolar), national, and local.
Stakeholder operations at these different levels can lead 
to conflicts of interest. International-level operations are rel-
atively new and have already led to strain between the A5 
nations and other nations with northern interests. The A5 
consider the Arctic as their region and view the develop-
ing interest by non-Arctic nations as a threat to their sov-
ereignty and their area claims in the Arctic. But this way of 
thinking is about to change as the Arctic is being opened 
to the international interests of non-Arctic nations such as 
China, Japan, and Germany. These stakeholders are mainly 
interested in environmental issues, the use of new shipping 
routes, and mining concessions.
In general, two main stakeholder groups can be identi-
fied: Arctic states and non-Arctic states. The Arctic states 
all have territory north of the Arctic Circle and are members 
of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental body estab-
lished in 1996. The main tasks of the Arctic Council (2007)
are to balance the interests between the Arctic states and the 
indigenous peoples, as well as answer questions about cli-
mate change and environmental protection. Arctic states, 
which include the A5 nations plus Sweden, Finland, and 
Iceland, are the decision makers at the Arctic Council. The 
A5 nations are interested in splitting the Arctic oil and natu-
ral gas deposits among themselves. Despite the uncertainty 
about how much oil and natural gas there really is in the 
Arctic, the A5 follow a “just in case” policy to protect their 
access to any potential resources. 
The non-Arctic states are increasingly recognizing the 
potential of the ice-free Arctic and directing their gaze 
towards it. Specifically, China looks at the new sea routes to 
shorten the commercial routes between China and Europe 
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and to bypass regions affected by piracy. The Arctic Coun-
cil recognizes France, Great Britain, Spain, Poland, the Neth-
erlands, and Germany as observers. Recently, Italy, Japan, 
China, and the European Union nations have lobbied to 
obtain observer status with the Arctic Council (Witschel et 
al., 2010). 
Other stakeholders include the indigenous populations 
of the Arctic, transnational organizations like the Euro-
pean Union and non-governmental groups (NGOs). Most of 
these non-state players operate on a local and national level 
because the Arctic states are the main players at the higher 
levels. The Arctic Council offers a framework in which the 
indigenous populations of the Arctic can present their inter-
ests, but they are not included in the decision-making proc-
esses. However, this situation could change in the future.
The interests of the indigenous populations lie in protect-
ing their homeland and way of life, which are threatened 
more and more by outside economic interests. Representa-
tives of indigenous peoples, such as the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council or the Saami Council, demand to be involved in 
the decision-making processes at the higher levels (Hein-
inen, 2004; Witschel et al., 2010). Environmental protection 
groups like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Green-
peace demand an agreement that will ensure ecosystem-
based management of resources that protects and preserves 
the Arctic and the Arctic Ocean (WWF International Arctic 
Programme, 2009, 2010).
SUMMARY
New economic possibilities bring new opportunities for 
the Arctic region, but also new dangers. The sensitive eco-
logical system of the Arctic is threatened by several factors. 
One important threat is the “just in case” policy of the Arctic 
states that are trying to protect their ability to gain territory 
and access to Arctic resources. A second is the increasing 
amount of transportation. A tanker catastrophe (like the Shen 
Neng 1 spill off the coast of Australia on 3 April 2010) would 
have disastrous effects. The future of the Arctic depends on 
the ability of all stakeholders to use the Arctic sustainably 
and to create governance structures that will protect the envi-
ronment and the populations living there. 
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